DocumentCode :
3219777
Title :
A cooperative strategy based on Nash bargaining solution under spectral mask constraint in cooperative relay networks
Author :
Fallah, Brima ; Benxiong, Huang ; Weihua, Yin
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Electron. & Inf. Eng., Huazhong Univ. of Sci. & Technol., Wuhan, China
fYear :
2011
fDate :
27-29 May 2011
Firstpage :
154
Lastpage :
159
Abstract :
Resource allocation among multiple users interference channel has posed significant issues in cooperative communication networks. A game-theoretic approach is studied under spectral mask constraints (SMCs) in cooperative relay networks using Amplify-and-Forward as a relaying protocol. The cooperative strategy employed as game-theoretic approach is based on the Nash bargaining solution (NBS). The Nash equilibrium and Nash bargaining solutions are derived for a two-player game based on the joint time division multiplexing and frequency division multiplexing (TDM/FDM) as a mode of cooperation. The condition for the uniqueness and existence of the NBS is derived.
Keywords :
cooperative communication; frequency division multiplexing; game theory; interference (signal); resource allocation; time division multiplexing; Nash bargaining solution; Nash equilibrium; amplify-and-forward; cooperative communication networks; cooperative relay networks; cooperative strategy; frequency division multiplexing; game-theoretic approach; joint time division multiplexing; multiple users interference channel; relaying protocol; resource allocation; spectral mask constraints; two-player game; Frequency division multiplexing; Games; Radio spectrum management; Relays; Resource management; Time division multiplexing; Time frequency analysis; Cooperative games; Cooperative relay; Nash bargaining; SMCs; TDM/FDM;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Communication Software and Networks (ICCSN), 2011 IEEE 3rd International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Xi´an
Print_ISBN :
978-1-61284-485-5
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/ICCSN.2011.6013683
Filename :
6013683
Link To Document :
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