Modeling User Churning Behavior in Wireless Networks Using Evolutionary Game Theory

Churning of mobile users from one service provider to another is expected to become a common feature when the mobile users have freedom to choose the best wireless service. This churning behavior impacts both the technical and the economical aspects of wireless network design. In this paper, we model the churning behavior of wireless service users by using the theory of evolutionary game. We consider a system model consisting of WLAN hotspots where a wireless user can choose among different WLAN access points based on the performances and/or price. A continuous-time Markov chain model is established to capture the connection arrival and departure processes, as well as the rational and irrational churning behaviors of wireless service users. The evolutionary equilibrium, which is used to compute the average number of users choosing each wireless service, is considered as the solution. Based on this evolutionary game framework, we investigate two different possible pricing schemes, namely, non-cooperative and cooperative pricing schemes, for the wireless service providers. These schemes maximize individual revenue and total revenue, respectively, of the service providers. Performance analysis results are presented for the proposed modeling framework.