DocumentCode
3339697
Title
On gaming in electricity markets under cap-and-trade
Author
El Khatib, Sameh ; Galiana, Francisco D.
fYear
2009
fDate
28-30 Sept. 2009
Firstpage
1
Lastpage
4
Abstract
This paper examines the effect of gaming by electricity generating companies (Gencos) operating in an electricity market under cap-and-trade. We show how Gencos strategically offer on the basis of their allocated allowances and emission intensities and, through an example, examine how this gaming strategy affects the Gencos´ profits and the overall market equilibrium.
Keywords
power markets; Gencos; cap-and-trade; electricity generating companies; electricity markets; Carbon dioxide; Cost function; Electricity supply industry; Environmental economics; Global warming; Pollution; Power generation; Cournot-Nash equilibrium; allowance allocation; cap-and-trade; gaming in electricity markets; greenhouse gas (GHG); market power;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Sustainable Alternative Energy (SAE), 2009 IEEE PES/IAS Conference on
Conference_Location
Valencia
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-4430-4
Electronic_ISBN
978-1-4244-4431-1
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/SAE.2009.5534850
Filename
5534850
Link To Document