Modeling Resource Sharing Dynamics of VoIP Users over a WLAN Using a Game-Theoretic Approach

We consider a scenario in which users share an access point and are mainly interested in VoIP applications. Each user is allowed to adapt to varying network conditions by choosing the transmission rate at which VoIP traffic is received. We denote this adaptation process by end-user congestion control, our object of study. The two questions that we ask are: (1) what are the performance consequences of letting the users to freely choose their rates? and (2) how to explain the adaptation process of the users? We set a controlled lab experiment having students as subject to answer the first question, and we extend an evolutionary game-theoretic model to address the second. Our partial answers are the following: (1) free users with local information can reach an equilibrium which is close to optimal from the system perspective. However, the equilibrium can be unfair; (2) the adaptation of the users can be explained using a game theoretic model. We propose a methodology to parameterize the latter, which involves active network measurements, simulations and an artificial neural network to estimate the QoS perceived by the users in each of the states of the model.