DocumentCode :
3355132
Title :
The choice between the law of penalization and superintendence of environmental protection from the view of game theory
Author :
Liping, Liu ; Xianjun, Wang
Author_Institution :
Social Sci. Dept, Harbin Univ. of Commerce, Harbin, China
fYear :
2010
fDate :
26-28 June 2010
Firstpage :
5055
Lastpage :
5058
Abstract :
Focusing on the serious environmental pollution and current situation of environmental protection in china, the article demonstrates a view to solving the problem by building a game theory model. The main idea is that we should restrict the enterprise´s movement by way of a series of policy in order to reduce the environmental problem(pollution). At the same time, the model is proved theoretically that the view is better than the current law of penalization only. Finally, the article brings forward some countermeasures from different aspects such as mechanism, management mode, legal system, social resource, ability, evaluation, market and technology.
Keywords :
environmental legislation; game theory; pollution; enterprise movement; environmental pollution; environmental protection; game theory; legal system; management mode; penalization law; social resource; superintendence; Business; Environmental economics; Environmentally friendly manufacturing techniques; Game theory; Law enforcement; Legal factors; Pollution; Protection; Resource management; Technology management; enterprise; game theory; law enforcers; model supervision;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Mechanic Automation and Control Engineering (MACE), 2010 International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Wuhan
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-7737-1
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/MACE.2010.5535993
Filename :
5535993
Link To Document :
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