DocumentCode
3367401
Title
Research on incentive and restraint mechanisms of ERP project implementation based on principal-agent theory
Author
Benxin, Lao
Author_Institution
ERP Lab., Guangxi Univ. of Finance & Econ., Nanning, China
fYear
2010
fDate
26-28 June 2010
Firstpage
6092
Lastpage
6094
Abstract
Principal-agent relationship exists in the ERP project implementation. For owners, it is difficult to simply use the “Compulsory contract” and the supervision to force the supplier to select the desired action to the owners. Combining project supervision with incentive contract is an optimal mechanism to encourage and restrict the supplier complete the ERP project by the owner´s expectation.
Keywords
consumer behaviour; contracts; enterprise resource planning; incentive schemes; ERP project implementation; incentive contract; incentive mechanism; principal agent relationship; principal agent theory; project supervision; restraint mechanism; Contracts; Electronics industry; Enterprise resource planning; Finance; Game theory; Laboratories; ERP; incentive and restraint mechanisms; principal-agent theory; project implementation;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Mechanic Automation and Control Engineering (MACE), 2010 International Conference on
Conference_Location
Wuhan
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-7737-1
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/MACE.2010.5536675
Filename
5536675
Link To Document