DocumentCode :
3379179
Title :
Towards formal analysis of security protocols
Author :
Mao, Wenbo ; Boyd, Colin
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Electr. Eng., Manchester Univ., UK
fYear :
1993
fDate :
15-17 Jun 1993
Firstpage :
147
Lastpage :
158
Abstract :
The pioneering and well-known work of M. Burrows, M. Abadi and R. Needham (1989), (the BAN logic) which dominates the area of security protocol analysis is shown to take an approach which is not fully formal and which consequently permits approval of dangerous protocols. Measures to make the BAN logic formal are then proposed. The formalisation is found to be desirable not only for its potential in providing rigorous analysis of security protocols, but also for its readiness for supporting a computer-aided fashion of analysis
Keywords :
formal logic; protocols; security of data; BAN logic; computer aided analysis; dangerous protocols; formalisation; rigorous analysis; security protocol analysis; Authentication; Body sensor networks; Computer bugs; Computer security; Cryptographic protocols; Cryptography; Debugging; Distributed computing; Information security; Logic;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Computer Security Foundations Workshop VI, 1993. Proceedings
Conference_Location :
Franconia, NH
Print_ISBN :
0-8186-3950-4
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/CSFW.1993.246631
Filename :
246631
Link To Document :
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