DocumentCode
3471600
Title
Games Analysis of Prevent "Insiders Control" Effectively
Author
Gong, Zhiyong ; Li, Dingan ; Fan, Qi
Author_Institution
South China Univ. of Technol., Guangzhou
fYear
2007
fDate
18-21 Aug. 2007
Firstpage
1089
Lastpage
1094
Abstract
Enterprise is a repeated sub game equilibrium set consists of stake-holders (physical capital owners and human capital owners) by negotiation and struggle with their effective contribution powers. This paper tries to find the core of the equilibrium set. United property rights institution can make enterprise become economic benefit union contain physical capital stock and human capital stock by their effective contribution powers, thus can prevent the problem of "Insiders control".
Keywords
game theory; stock markets; equilibrium set; games analysis; human capital stock; physical capital stock; united property rights institution; Automation; Control systems; Energy management; Environmental economics; Humans; Logistics; Power generation economics; Power system management; Project management; Stress control; Game theory; Insiders control; United Property rights institution;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Automation and Logistics, 2007 IEEE International Conference on
Conference_Location
Jinan
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-1531-1
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICAL.2007.4338730
Filename
4338730
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