On proportional power sharing mechanisms for secondary spectrum markets

Author

Berry, Randall A.

Author_Institution

Dept. of EECS, Northwestern Univ., Evanston, IL, USA

fYear

2009

fDate

13-16 Dec. 2009

Firstpage

13

Lastpage

16

Abstract

We consider a proportional sharing mechanism for allocating spectrum to secondary users. Each user bids for a portion of the received power at a measurement point and receives a share that is proportional to its bid while paying a charge equal to the bid. The users then transmit over a common band treating all interference as noise. Under this mechanism, we model the secondary users as players is a bidding game. The players´ interaction in this game is complicated due to the interference among them.We characterize the existence of a Nash equilibrium for both price taking and price anticipating users.

Keywords

game theory; radio spectrum management; radiofrequency interference; Nash equilibrium; interference; proportional power sharing mechanisms; secondary spectrum markets; spectrum allocation; Charge measurement; Conferences; Current measurement; Game theory; Interference constraints; Licenses; Nash equilibrium; Power measurement; Resource management; USA Councils;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

Computational Advances in Multi-Sensor Adaptive Processing (CAMSAP), 2009 3rd IEEE International Workshop on

Conference_Location

Aruba, Dutch Antilles

Print_ISBN

978-1-4244-5179-1

Electronic_ISBN

978-1-4244-5180-7

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/CAMSAP.2009.5413318

Filename

5413318