DocumentCode :
3478462
Title :
Bayesian Nash equilibrium bidding strategies for generation companies
Author :
Fang, Debin ; Wang, Xianjia ; Ouyang, Fangrui ; Ye, Chun
Author_Institution :
Inst. of Syst. Eng., Wuhan Univ., China
Volume :
2
fYear :
2004
fDate :
5-8 April 2004
Firstpage :
692
Abstract :
With the reform of the electric power system and the development of generation power market in China, it is of significance to develop bidding strategies for generators. Bidding strategy is the profile of bidding price and bidding quantities, which is submitted by market participants, and auctioneer determines a rule to allocate the aggregate demand quantity among all generators, regarded as auction problem with divisible object. This paper describes discriminating pricing auction rule with divisible object auction, builds the Bayesian game model of the divisible object auction under the generator´s private cost information. Moreover, we resolve Nash equilibrium of a Bayesian game, transform Nash equilibrium of a Bayesian game as Nash equilibrium of the strategic game, with regarding marginal cost as the type of players, and get bidder´s bidding strategy under a certain marginal cost function of bidder.
Keywords :
game theory; power markets; pricing; Bayesian game modal; China; Nash equilibrium; bidding price; bidding strategy; demand quantity; electric power system; generation companies; generators; marginal cost; power market; pricing auction rule; strategic game; Bayesian methods; Cities and towns; Costs; Electricity supply industry; Game theory; Nash equilibrium; Partial response channels; Power generation; Power markets; Power system modeling;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Electric Utility Deregulation, Restructuring and Power Technologies, 2004. (DRPT 2004). Proceedings of the 2004 IEEE International Conference on
Print_ISBN :
0-7803-8237-4
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/DRPT.2004.1338072
Filename :
1338072
Link To Document :
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