• DocumentCode
    3486932
  • Title

    Market clearing price discovery in a single and double-side auction market mechanisms: Linear programming solution

  • Author

    Gutiérrez, G. ; Quiñónez, J. ; Sheblé, G.B.

  • Author_Institution
    Inst. Tecnol. de Morelia, Morelia
  • fYear
    2005
  • fDate
    27-30 June 2005
  • Firstpage
    1
  • Lastpage
    5
  • Abstract
    This paper analyzes the market price discovery process in an auction market structure. The market clearing price determines the market equilibrium, price and quantity. Once price discovery occurs, the bids are committed, and contracts are written Single and double-side auction market structures are analyzed. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the market clearing prices discovery.
  • Keywords
    linear programming; power markets; auction market mechanisms; linear programming solution; market clearing price discovery; Artificial intelligence; Consumer electronics; Contracts; Explosions; Investments; Lagrangian functions; Linear programming; Privacy; Resource management; Auction mechanism; market clearing price;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Power Tech, 2005 IEEE Russia
  • Conference_Location
    St. Petersburg
  • Print_ISBN
    978-5-93208-034-4
  • Electronic_ISBN
    978-5-93208-034-4
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/PTC.2005.4524694
  • Filename
    4524694
    • Link To Document
    https://search.isc.ac/dl/search/defaultta.aspx?DTC=49&DC=3486932