DocumentCode
3633013
Title
Achieving Security Despite Compromise Using Zero-knowledge
Author
Michael Backes;Martin P. Grochulla;Catalin Hritcu;Matteo Maffei
Author_Institution
Saarland Univ., Saarbrucken, Germany
fYear
2009
Firstpage
308
Lastpage
323
Abstract
One of the important challenges when designing and analyzing cryptographic protocols is the enforcement of security properties in the presence of compromised participants. This paper presents a general technique for strengthening cryptographic protocols in order to satisfy authorization policies despite participant compromise. The central idea is to automatically transform the original cryptographic protocols by adding non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs.Each participant proves that the messages sent to the other participants are generated in accordance to the protocol.The zero-knowledge proofs are forwarded to ensure the correct behavior of all participants involved in the protocol, without revealing any secret data.We use an enhanced type system for zero-knowledge to verify that the transformed protocols conform to their authorization policy even if some participants are compromised.Finally, we developed a tool that automatically generates ML implementations of protocols based on zero-knowledge proofs.The protocol transformation, the verification, and the generation of protocol implementations are fully automated.
Keywords
"Cryptographic protocols","Cryptography","Computer security","Authorization","Data security","Libraries","Authentication","Electronic voting","Application software","Digital signatures"
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Computer Security Foundations Symposium, 2009. CSF ´09. 22nd IEEE
ISSN
1063-6900
Print_ISBN
978-0-7695-3712-2
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/CSF.2009.24
Filename
5230610
Link To Document