Covert low-power QoS attack in all-optical wavelength routed networks

In transparent WDM (wavelength division multiplexing) optical networks, some component and network vulnerabilities can be used by malicious attackers to implement QoS (quality of service) degrading/disruptive attacks. Among the attacks, some are easy to detect, locate and isolate, while some are not. For those covert attacks, which impair the BER of the legitimate channels without triggering alarms at the immediate attacking spot, the service impact may be much more severe than the overt attacks, since the NMS (network management system) might mis-diagnose the failure location. This paper studies one specific form of the covert attacks, which we name the low-power QoS attack. The attacking method, QoS impact, as well as the propagating nature of this attack are investigated. Our study shows that the low-power attack is easy to implement, yet its damage to the BER performance can be significant. Multiple colluding low-power attacks are capable of greater QoS impact using less attacking intensity. Measures to protect the network from low-power attack are also proposed.