Admission control and pricing in competitive wireless networks based on non-cooperative game theory

The number of wireless network providers offering high data rate services in hot-spot areas as well as the competition among them will continue to grow in the near future. The users on the other hand will probably alter their behaviour towards the networks by making short-term commitments through ephemeral session-based subscriptions and requiring increased quality for the service they receive. In this upcoming environment, providers have to take into account in their admission control policies not only technical but also other parameters, like money revenue, reputation, and user satisfaction. We model the procedure of temporal session establishment as an extensive form game between the different parties involved, namely the provider, its current users, and the potential customer. The solution of this game produces an integrated pricing and admission control policy that achieves the network provider´s optimum utility, while ensuring the satisfaction of all sides. We compare our session admission control scheme with a purely technical algorithm and show that our admission policy better reflects the current requirements of the environment, yielding higher utility values to the provider