DocumentCode
515130
Title
Evolution games and the real estate market
Author
Yunna, Wu ; Yan, Zhang
Author_Institution
North China Electr. Power Univ., Beijing, China
Volume
2
fYear
2010
fDate
9-10 Jan. 2010
Firstpage
839
Lastpage
842
Abstract
Based on the dynamic evolution of game and the limited rationality, the question that why the policy for the game of central real estate and a real estate developers was no work was explored. Based on this discovery, it finds that the abolition of unreasonable fees and the introduction of a unified property tax cannot adjust to the price. The only key is to contain the transferring to the consumers, which makes housing prices return to normal levels. Finally, the suggestion that using lower price to release more funds for the expansion of domestic demand and restricting the sources of speculators´ funding are gave to government to regulate and control real estate effectively.
Keywords
evolutionary computation; marketing; real estate data processing; central real estate; domestic demand; dynamic evolution; evolution games; government; real estate developers; real estate market; Cities and towns; Control systems; Electrical equipment industry; Electronic mail; Europe; Game theory; Investments; Local government; Power generation economics; Supply and demand; Developers; Evolution of the Game; Government; Real Estate;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Logistics Systems and Intelligent Management, 2010 International Conference on
Conference_Location
Harbin
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-7331-1
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICLSIM.2010.5461067
Filename
5461067
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