• DocumentCode
    515130
  • Title

    Evolution games and the real estate market

  • Author

    Yunna, Wu ; Yan, Zhang

  • Author_Institution
    North China Electr. Power Univ., Beijing, China
  • Volume
    2
  • fYear
    2010
  • fDate
    9-10 Jan. 2010
  • Firstpage
    839
  • Lastpage
    842
  • Abstract
    Based on the dynamic evolution of game and the limited rationality, the question that why the policy for the game of central real estate and a real estate developers was no work was explored. Based on this discovery, it finds that the abolition of unreasonable fees and the introduction of a unified property tax cannot adjust to the price. The only key is to contain the transferring to the consumers, which makes housing prices return to normal levels. Finally, the suggestion that using lower price to release more funds for the expansion of domestic demand and restricting the sources of speculators´ funding are gave to government to regulate and control real estate effectively.
  • Keywords
    evolutionary computation; marketing; real estate data processing; central real estate; domestic demand; dynamic evolution; evolution games; government; real estate developers; real estate market; Cities and towns; Control systems; Electrical equipment industry; Electronic mail; Europe; Game theory; Investments; Local government; Power generation economics; Supply and demand; Developers; Evolution of the Game; Government; Real Estate;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Logistics Systems and Intelligent Management, 2010 International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Harbin
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-7331-1
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ICLSIM.2010.5461067
  • Filename
    5461067