An efficient truthful double spectrum auction design for dynamic spectrum access

Spectrum auctions can motivate the legacy (primary) spectrum owners to lease their idle spectrum to other secondary spectrum users and eventually improve the spectrum utilization. Compared with traditional auctions, a significant difference of spectrum auctions is the spatial reusability, which means several buyers can use the same channel if they are far away from each other such that they will not interfere with each other. The challenge is how to exploit spatial reusability to improve spectrum utilization while keeping the auctions economic-robust (truthful in particular). In this paper, we propose TDSA, an efficient truthful double spectrum auction design to solve this problem, which has a novel virtual group bidding mechanism to improve spectrum utilization as well as a unique pricing strategy to guarantee truthfulness. We prove that our proposal is truthful. Experimental results show that our proposal can efficiently exploit spatial reusability of spectrum to achieve high spectrum utilization in most cases.