• DocumentCode
    555553
  • Title

    The control of moral hazard in PPP project renegotiation

  • Author

    Bi, Xing ; Wang, Hong

  • Author_Institution
    Coll. of Manage. & Econ., Tianjin Univ., Tianjin, China
  • Volume
    Part 1
  • fYear
    2011
  • fDate
    3-5 Sept. 2011
  • Firstpage
    232
  • Lastpage
    236
  • Abstract
    The proportion of the renegotiation in PPP (public-private-partnership) projects was gradually increasing year by year, and the presentation of the adverse selection and moral hazard problems were also increasingly prominent. Moral hazard in the renegotiation not only led to the loss of social surplus, but also resulted that both sides could not get their maximum benefit in the long run. Government regulation, public supervision and incentive mechanisms were important factors which affected private enterprises to take opportunistic strategy or cooperative strategy in the renegotiation. After the renegotiation happened, through the qualitative and quantitative analysis on factors relevant of private enterprises´ moral hazard, the government could make response measures related to the maximum degree of inhibition of private enterprises´ moral hazard in the renegotiation.
  • Keywords
    organisational aspects; project management; public administration; strategic planning; PPP project renegotiation; cooperative strategy; government regulation; incentive mechanism; moral hazard control; opportunistic strategy; private enterprise; public supervision; public-private-partnership project; social surplus; Analytical models; Contracts; Economics; Ethics; Government; Hazards; Investments; PPP; moral hazard; opportunism; renegotiation;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management (IE&EM), 2011 IEEE 18Th International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Changchun
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-61284-446-6
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ICIEEM.2011.6035147
  • Filename
    6035147