Title :
Invariance-based concurrent error detection for Advanced Encryption Standard
Author :
Guo, Xiaofei ; Karri, Ramesh
Author_Institution :
Metrotech Center, Polytech. Inst. of New York Univ., Brooklyn, NY, USA
Abstract :
Naturally occurring and maliciously injected faults reduce the reliability of Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and may leak confidential information. We developed an invariance-based concurrent error detection (CED) scheme which is independent of the implementation of AES encryption/decryption. Additionally, we improve the security of our scheme with Randomized CED Round Insertion and adaptive checking. Experimental results show that the invariance-based CED scheme detects all single-bit, all singlebyte fault, and 99.99999997% of burst faults. The area and delay overheads of this scheme are compared with those of previously reported CED schemes on two Xilinx Virtex FPGAs. The hardware overhead is in the 13.2-27.3% range and the throughput is between 1.8-42.2Gbps depending on the AES architecture, FPGA family, and the detection latency. One can implement our scheme in many ways; designers can trade off performance, reliability, and security according to the available resources.
Keywords :
cryptography; error detection; field programmable gate arrays; AES architecture; AES decryption; AES encryption; CED scheme; FPGA family; Xilinx Virtex FPGA; advanced encryption standard; confidential information leakage; detection latency; invariance-based concurrent error detection scheme; malicious injected faults; naturally occuring injected faults; randomized CED adaptive checking; randomized CED round insertion; reliability reduction; Circuit faults; Encryption; Hardware; Logic gates; Redundancy; Throughput; Concurrent error detection; Fault injection attack; Reliability;
Conference_Titel :
Design Automation Conference (DAC), 2012 49th ACM/EDAC/IEEE
Conference_Location :
San Francisco, CA
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4503-1199-1