• DocumentCode
    583076
  • Title

    Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGAs): Possible Attacks and Proposed Mitigation Approaches

  • Author

    Alsadeh, A. ; Rafiee, Hosnieh ; Meinel, Christoph

  • Author_Institution
    Hasso Plattner Inst., Univ. of Potsdam, Potsdam, Germany
  • fYear
    2012
  • fDate
    27-29 Oct. 2012
  • Firstpage
    332
  • Lastpage
    339
  • Abstract
    Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGAs) were mainly designed to prove address ownership and to prevent the theft of existing IPv6 addresses by binding the owner´s public key to the generated address. The address owner uses a corresponding private key to prove its ownership by using signed messages that are originated from that address. Though the CGA approach is quite useful in providing a means of proving address ownership in IPv6 networks, it does have some limitations and some vulnerabilities. In this paper we will provide a security analysis and descriptions of possible ways of attacking CGA. We found that the CGA verification process is prone mainly to Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. We also found that CGAs are still susceptible to privacy related attacks. We will therefore propose some extensions to the CGA standard verification algorithm to mitigate DoS attacks and to make CGA more privacy-conscious.
  • Keywords
    private key cryptography; public key cryptography; CGA approach; DoS attacks; IPv6 addresses; IPv6 networks; cryptographically generated addresses; denial-of-service attacks; privacy related attacks; private key; proposed mitigation approaches; public key; signed messages; Authentication; Computer crime; Computers; Public key; Standards; Authentication of IPv6 addresses; IPv6 Privacy; IPv6 Security; IPv6 addresses ownership;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Computer and Information Technology (CIT), 2012 IEEE 12th International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Chengdu
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4673-4873-7
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/CIT.2012.84
  • Filename
    6391923