Collusion-resistant repeated double auctions for cooperative communications

Deployment of relay nodes to existing wireless net-works recently has received much attention since the channel capacity from sources to destinations through the cooperation of relay nodes is greatly enhanced. However, choosing appropriate relay nodes is critical to maximize the overall network performance. In this paper, we consider the assignment problem of relay nodes in a cooperative wireless network, where physical relay infrastructures and relay supporting services (relay assignment) are independently operated by different selfish entities with each being driven by its own benefit. We first formulate the problem as a repeated double auction by taking into account the benefits of all entities. Specifically, we consider a system that consists of a set of source-to-destination pairs, where the source nodes are grouped into groups and each of them is represented by a group agent. We assume that both the source nodes and the group agents seek opportunities to maximize their own benefits through various means including untruthful bidding and collusion with each other, and so on. To maximize the social benefit of the system that include the benefits of the source nodes, the relay nodes and the auctioneer, we devise an auction which we refer it to as the repeated multi-heterogeneous-item double auction with collusion resistance. We also analytically show that this auction is not only truthful but also collusion resistant. The experimental results indicate that the proposed auction is effective in collusion-resistance.