A Non-cooperative hierarchical Opportunistic Spectrum Access for cognitive radio networks

We consider a non-cooperative Opportunistic Spectrum Access (OSA) where Secondary Users (SUs) access opportunistically the spectrum licensed for Primary Users (PUs) in TV white spaces (TVWS). As sensing licensed channels is time and energy consuming, we consider a hierarchical Cognitive Radio (CR) architecture, where CR base stations sense a subset of the spectrum in order to locate some free frequencies. Thereafter, a SU that needs to communicate through TVWS sends a request to a CR base station for a free channel. We model the problem using a Partially Observable Stochastic Game (POSG), and we take into consideration the energy consumption of CR base stations and the Quality of Services (QoS) of SUs. Since solving POSG optimally may require a significant amount of time and computational complexity, we model the OSA problem using a game theoretical approach, and we propose a symmetric Nash equilibrium solution concept. Finally, we provide some simulations that validate our theoretical findings.