Coping with a Smart Jammer in Wireless Networks: A Stackelberg Game Approach

Jamming defense is an important yet challenging problem. In this paper, we study the jamming defense problem in the presence of a smart jammer, who can quickly learn the transmission power of the user and adaptively adjust its transmission power to maximize the damaging effect. We consider both the single-channel model and the multi-channel model. By modeling the problem as a Stackelberg game, we compute the optimal transmission power for the user to maximize its utility, in the presence of a smart jammer. For the single-channel model, we prove the existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE) by giving closed-form expressions for the SE strategies of both the user and the player. For the multi-channel model, we prove the existence of the SE. We design algorithms for computing the jammer´s best response strategy and approximating the user´s optimal strategy. Finally, we validate our theoretical analysis through extensive simulations.