Research on the decision models of closed loop supply chain and the value of information sharing

Consider a closed loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of one manufacturer, two retailers and one third-party recovery enterprise, where the new products and remanufactured products produced by manufacturer are sold respectively by two retailers. The Stackelberg game is analysed among the CLSC, and the decision models with and without information sharing of CLSC are put forward. The models are bi-level programs whose upper-level is the profit-maximization problem of manufacturer and lower-level is the profit-maximization problems of two retailers and recovery enterprise respectively under two case that the full demand information obtained by manufacturer is shared or isn´t shared by two retailer. The value of information sharing is analysed. It shows that information sharing will increase the wholesale price, decrease the retail prices, and increase the demands and the profit of CLSC when market scale observed is lower than the mean of market scale, but the change trend is contrary when market scale observed is larger than the mean of market scale.