• DocumentCode
    6910
  • Title

    The Price of Anarchy in the Markovian Single Server Queue

  • Author

    Gilboa-Freedman, Gail ; Hassin, Refael ; Kerner, Yoav

  • Author_Institution
    Dept. of Stat. & Oper. Res., Tel Aviv Univ., Tel Aviv, Israel
  • Volume
    59
  • Issue
    2
  • fYear
    2014
  • fDate
    Feb. 2014
  • Firstpage
    455
  • Lastpage
    459
  • Abstract
    The Price of Anarchy (PoA) is a measure for the loss of optimality due to decentralized behavior. It has been studied in many settings but, surprisingly, not in the most fundamental queueing system involving customers´ decisions, namely, the single server Markovian queue. We find that the loss of efficiency in such systems is bounded by 50% in most practical cases, in which the arrival rate of the customers is significantly lower than the service rate. We also find that the loss of efficiency has an interesting behavior in two aspects: first, it sharply increases as the arrival rate comes close to the service rate; second, it becomes unbounded exactly when the arrival rate is greater than the service rate, a surprising behavior because the system is always stable. Knowing these bounds is important for the queue controller, for example when considering an investment in added service capacity.
  • Keywords
    Markov processes; game theory; investment; optimisation; queueing theory; Markovian single server queue; PoA; added service capacity; customer arrival rate; customers decisions; decentralized behavior; efficiency loss; investment; optimality; price of anarchy; queue controller; queueing system; service rate; single server Markovian queue; Adaptive control; cost function; numerical simulation;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Journal_Title
    Automatic Control, IEEE Transactions on
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • ISSN
    0018-9286
  • Type

    jour

  • DOI
    10.1109/TAC.2013.2270872
  • Filename
    6545289