DocumentCode
6910
Title
The Price of Anarchy in the Markovian Single Server Queue
Author
Gilboa-Freedman, Gail ; Hassin, Refael ; Kerner, Yoav
Author_Institution
Dept. of Stat. & Oper. Res., Tel Aviv Univ., Tel Aviv, Israel
Volume
59
Issue
2
fYear
2014
fDate
Feb. 2014
Firstpage
455
Lastpage
459
Abstract
The Price of Anarchy (PoA) is a measure for the loss of optimality due to decentralized behavior. It has been studied in many settings but, surprisingly, not in the most fundamental queueing system involving customers´ decisions, namely, the single server Markovian queue. We find that the loss of efficiency in such systems is bounded by 50% in most practical cases, in which the arrival rate of the customers is significantly lower than the service rate. We also find that the loss of efficiency has an interesting behavior in two aspects: first, it sharply increases as the arrival rate comes close to the service rate; second, it becomes unbounded exactly when the arrival rate is greater than the service rate, a surprising behavior because the system is always stable. Knowing these bounds is important for the queue controller, for example when considering an investment in added service capacity.
Keywords
Markov processes; game theory; investment; optimisation; queueing theory; Markovian single server queue; PoA; added service capacity; customer arrival rate; customers decisions; decentralized behavior; efficiency loss; investment; optimality; price of anarchy; queue controller; queueing system; service rate; single server Markovian queue; Adaptive control; cost function; numerical simulation;
fLanguage
English
Journal_Title
Automatic Control, IEEE Transactions on
Publisher
ieee
ISSN
0018-9286
Type
jour
DOI
10.1109/TAC.2013.2270872
Filename
6545289
Link To Document