DocumentCode
779796
Title
Finding core solutions for power system fixed cost allocation
Author
Bjørndal, E. ; Stamtsis, G.C. ; Erlich, I.
Author_Institution
Norwegian Sch. of Econ. & Bus. Adm., Bergen, Norway
Volume
152
Issue
2
fYear
2005
fDate
3/4/2005 12:00:00 AM
Firstpage
173
Lastpage
179
Abstract
The cost allocation problem faced by an operator of an electricity network, where the fixed cost of the network has to be allocated among its users is discussed. Usage-based methods, such as the postage stamp rate method and the MW-mile method, are easy to understand and compute, but may yield cost allocations for which some transactions are subsidising others. Formally, this is equivalent to allocations outside of the core of the corresponding co-operative cost game. The main contribution of this paper is to present a method, similar to a well known method for computing the nucleolus of a cooperative game, by which several usage-based methods may be combined to produce allocations that are in, or as close as possible to, the core. Simulation results are conducted using two test systems.
Keywords
game theory; power markets; pricing; tariffs; co-operative game theory; cooperative game; power markets; power system fixed cost allocation; usage-based methods;
fLanguage
English
Journal_Title
Generation, Transmission and Distribution, IEE Proceedings-
Publisher
iet
ISSN
1350-2360
Type
jour
DOI
10.1049/ip-gtd:20041304
Filename
1421134
Link To Document