DocumentCode
832227
Title
A two-player game model of power cogeneration in New England
Author
Haurie, A. ; Loulou, R. ; Savard, G.
Author_Institution
Geneve Univ., Switzerland
Volume
37
Issue
9
fYear
1992
fDate
9/1/1992 12:00:00 AM
Firstpage
1451
Lastpage
1456
Abstract
The interaction between a utility company and electricity cogenerators is modeled via a game-theoretic, systems analysis approach, under the assumption of asymmetric pricing of electricity purchased or sold by the cogenerators. The pricing scheme is derived from the PURPA legislation prevailing in the US and is compared to an efficient operation of the global system. An adaptation of a successive approximation algorithm is developed and applied to the case of New England. The results are presented for three scenarios which simulate the status quo, the PURPA situation, and the ideal cooperative optimum
Keywords
cogeneration; electricity supply industry; game theory; tariffs; New England; PURPA legislation; US; asymmetric pricing; ideal cooperative optimum; power cogeneration; successive approximation algorithm; two-player game model; utility company; Approximation algorithms; Cogeneration; Control systems; Cost function; Energy consumption; Game theory; Legislation; Power system modeling; Pricing; Routing;
fLanguage
English
Journal_Title
Automatic Control, IEEE Transactions on
Publisher
ieee
ISSN
0018-9286
Type
jour
DOI
10.1109/9.159591
Filename
159591
Link To Document