• DocumentCode
    87101
  • Title

    SmokeGrenade: An Efficient Key Generation Protocol With Artificial Interference

  • Author

    Dajiang Chen ; Zhen Qin ; Xufei Mao ; Panlong Yang ; Zhiguang Qin ; Ruijin Wang

  • Author_Institution
    Sch. of Comput. Sci. & Eng., Univ. of Electron. Sci. & Technol. of China, Chengdu, China
  • Volume
    8
  • Issue
    11
  • fYear
    2013
  • fDate
    Nov. 2013
  • Firstpage
    1731
  • Lastpage
    1745
  • Abstract
    Leveraging a wireless multipath channel as the source of common randomness, many key generation methods have been proposed according to the information-theory security. However, existing schemes suffer a low generation rate and a low entropy, and mainly rely on nodes´ mobility. To overcome this limitation, we present a key generation protocol with known artificial interference, named SmokeGrenade, a new physical-layer approach for secret key generation in a narrowband fading channel. Our scheme utilizes artificial interference to contribute to the change of measured values on channel states. Our theoretical analysis shows that the key generation rate increases with the increment of the interference power. Particularly, the achievable key rate of SmokeGrenade gains three times better than that of the traditional key generation schemes when the average interference power is normalized to 1. Simulation results also demonstrate that SmokeGrenade achieves a higher generation rate and entropy compared with some state-of-the-art approaches.
  • Keywords
    fading channels; information theory; interference; protocols; telecommunication security; wireless channels; SmokeGrenade; artificial interference; fading channel; information-theory security; key generation protocol; secret key generation; wireless multipath channel; Communication system security; Entropy; Fading; Interference; Jamming; Protocols; Wireless communication; Secret key generation; artificial interference; physical layer security; wireless security;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Journal_Title
    Information Forensics and Security, IEEE Transactions on
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • ISSN
    1556-6013
  • Type

    jour

  • DOI
    10.1109/TIFS.2013.2278834
  • Filename
    6582550